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June 24, 2026

Mr. Michael Kratsios
Director
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
1650 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Director Kratsios:

I write regarding biosafety risks associated with artificial intelligence, including the synthesis and trade of nucleic acids.

In a recent open letter, researchers and AI company executives, including Google DeepMind, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Microsoft AI, stated "there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode."[1] AI technology is now capable of developing synthetic nucleic acid, which could be misused to produce similar chemical and biological compounds of concern. Recent studies show that AI models can be retrained to create molecules designed for toxicity or used to design novel protein sequences that emulate the composition of known dangerous gene sequences.[2]

In addition to the development of synthetic nucleic acid, there are also concerns about the ability to mail-order synthetic DNA and RNA directly from synthesis companies. Although many consumers are qualified scientific researchers and biotechnology companies, not all providers may thoroughly screen customers nor keep records of previous synthesis orders. Without adequate safeguards, including both screening and traceability processes, malicious actors could use advances in AI to develop potentially dangerous pathogens and biological weapons.

Under the Biden Administration, Executive Order 14110 was issued in October 2023, titled, *Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.*[3] This order, in part, directed the Federal government to mitigate the misuse of synthetic nucleic acids, increase

[1] "In Support of Mandatory Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening and Recordkeeping," June 2026, https://screendna.org.
[2] Fabio Urbina et al., "Dual Use of Artificial-Intelligence-Powered Drug Discovery," *Nature Machine Intelligence*, vol. 4, March 2022. Bruce J. Wittmann et al., "Strengthening nucleic acid biosecurity screening against generative protein design tools," October 2025, https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adu8578.
[3] The White House, "Executive Order 14110: Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence," October 2023, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/11/01/2023-24283/safe-secure-and-trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence.

biosecurity, and led to the creation of the 2024 *Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening*.[4] However, in January 2025, President Trump rescinded this order and in May 2025, issued a new order titled, *Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research,* which directs OSTP to revise or replace the 2024 framework within 90 days.[5]

It has been over 400 days since this order was issued, yet it is unclear if a revised or new framework has been developed.

Therefore, I ask that you please provide an answer to the following questions in writing by July 17, 2026:

1. Has OSTP revised or replaced the 2024 *Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening* as directed by Executive Order 14292?[6] If not, please provide the current status and anticipated release timeline for the updated framework.

2. In what ways can the Federal government mitigate potential harms from emerging technology as we facilitate necessary Federally funded and non-Federally funded scientific and medical research?

3. Do you believe artificial intelligence and its use in biological fields should be regulated to prevent harm, such as the potential development of novel biological weapons?

    a. Do you believe current biosafety and biosecurity oversight structures are sufficient to mitigate this harm?

    b. If not, what additional oversight, screening, and traceability measures do you recommend implementing for synthesis companies and customers to address potential dangers?

4. Are OSTP or other administrative agencies considering tightening regulations and standards related to the trade or synthesis of nucleic acids to safeguard the American public?

    a. What additional statutory authority, if any, does OSTP need from Congress?

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[4] Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening," April 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20250116081944/https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Nucleic-Acid_Synthesis_Screening_Framework.pdf

[5] The White House, "Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions," January 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/initial-rescissions-of-harmful-executive-orders-and-actions/.
The White House, "Executive Order 14292: Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research," May 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/05/improving-the-safety-and-security-of-biological-research/.

[6] The White House, "Executive Order 14292: Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research."

b. Which Federal departments and independent agencies, in addition to OSTP, do you believe are most equipped to engage in the oversight of the screening, sale, and recordkeeping of synthetic nucleic acids?

    i. If there are none, do you believe a new agency should be established with statutory authority over artificial intelligence and emerging technologies?

Thank you for your consideration of this request. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Jon Ossoff
United States Senator

CC:
The Honorable Howard Lutnick, Secretary of Commerce
The Honorable Arvind Raman, Under Secretary for Standards and Technology and NIST Director
The Honorable Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Secretary of Health and Human Services
The Honorable Marco Rubio, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs